Power at risk: Central Europe’s grid and the new energy security challenges

Key takeaway: the Visegrad countries are not doing enough to secure energy and facilitate the transition from imported fossil fuels to renewables

At the opening panel, “Energy security in Central Europe: between vulnerability and transformation,” Paweł Czyżak, Interim Europe Programme Director at Ember, underscored the structural weaknesses that continue to expose the Visegrad region. He noted that critical energy infrastructure across Central Europe – and indeed much of the EU – still lacks the level of protection typically afforded to hospitals or military assets, leaving it vulnerable to targeted attacks and sabotage. He argued that rising NATO defence budgets should therefore support the modernisation and safeguarding of energy systems alongside traditional transport infrastructure.

A political dimension was also highlighted: despite accounting for a third of the EU’s population and economic output, the region remains underrepresented in Brussels. Limited cohesion and inconsistent engagement in EU policymaking allow Western European countries to shape the agenda and capture a disproportionate share of the benefits. Strengthening regional cooperation and asserting a clearer vision for the clean-energy transition will be essential if Central Europe is to close this gap and enhance its long-term security.

The discussion centred on three core themes: the region’s vulnerability to attacks on its energy assets, lack of coordination needed to represent the region’s interests at the EU level and demand-side measures as the most effective tool for enhancing energy security.

Panelists speaking at the CEEC conference

Vulnerability to cyber and physical threats

The region’s vulnerability to malicious attacks on its energy infrastructure was underlined several times. Just like in Ukraine, energy infrastructure can be targeted anywhere in Europe. The threat is particularly acute on Europe’s eastern flank, given its geographic proximity to adversarial third countries and the centralized nature of national energy systems. A single act of sabotage disabling a baseload power plant could cause a devastating blackout at relatively little cost. These assets are not well fortified against physical attacks, while cyber attacks are even cheaper and easier to carry out. Furthermore, the region’s weak grid interconnectivity means back up sources are not readily available to mitigate a crisis.

In addition to hard measures like air defense and security monitoring, the need for decentralised grids and greater system flexibility was repeatedly emphasised in the context of energy security. Yet Visegrad countries are moving in the opposite direction, consolidating or expanding their reliance on nuclear power and centralized grid networks.

Pawel Czyzak, Ember’s Interim Europe Programme Director, speaking at the CEEC

Lack of regional vision and coordination

Despite shared energy characteristics and challenges, the region does not coordinate or represent its interests very well at the EU level. As a result, countries are left implementing EU legislation that is largely shaped by Western European priorities.

There are several reasons for this. First, long-term national strategies are often delayed, and ministries struggle to keep pace with EU demands and deadlines. Second, deep divisions within the Visegrad countries over EU sanctions on Russian energy have made strategic cooperation almost impossible. Finally, grid operators have become frustrated after years of EU bureaucracy and administrative requirements related to funding, which delay projects by an average of two years.

Regardless of the cause, the lack of cohesion and weak advocacy in Brussels has tangible consequences. Central and Eastern Europe consistently secures far less EU funding for critical grid upgrades than its actual needs would justify. Most of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), whose budget was expanded to EUR 27 billion in the next Multiannual Financial Framework, is going to North Sea offshore grid projects in a densely connected region. This is not because the region’s needs are smaller – Central and Eastern Europe is significantly less interconnected – but because Western actors have stronger regional cooperation structures and more experience in developing and pitching projects in Brussels.

The implications extend beyond energy security. Electricity prices in parts of the region remain higher than in Germany due to well-known bottlenecks at the Hungary–Slovakia border and within Austria. While Central Europe benefited substantially from EU funding for gas infrastructure over the past decade, that success was possible because regional and EU priorities were aligned – something largely missing today.

Energy security is best served on the demand side

Everyone agreed that the most cost-effective path to stronger energy security is straightforward: use less energy and build a more flexible system. Clear price signals are essential to encourage households and industry to adjust their consumption patterns. Although modest investments in smart metering and digitalisation are needed, the returns are significant. Flexibility remains one of the most cost-effective tools available – cutting demand during peak periods, lowering overall system costs and serving as a powerful safeguard against blackouts.

By contrast, decarbonized gases offer only limited potential as a local substitute for natural gas. In Hungary, even the most optimistic scenario for biogas represents the equivalent of only 10% of gas demand in 2030. Hydrogen, participants agreed, is essentially off the agenda because it remains prohibitively expensive and should be reserved for industrial use.

Further energy security context

Weary of the gas trap

Europe now has enough LNG and interconnectivity capacity to eliminate reliance on Russian gas. By 2028, when the European Commission’s ban takes effect, no country – including Hungary and Slovakia – will face material price impacts, despite government claims to the contrary.

However, phasing out Russian gas by replacing it with liquified natural gas (LNG)  does not resolve the region’s fundamental energy dependency problem. While this shift is geopolitically significant, it merely replaces one form of  dependency with another – on a more expensive, more polluting and more volatile fuel.

The revised energy security framework expected to be announced by the European Commission in Q1 2026 represents an opportunity to focus more on demand reduction and flexibility rather than supply diversification, which has largely been achieved, as evidenced by the Russian phase-out.

Within this framework, remaining gas projects eligible for public funding should face closer scrutiny to prevent stranded assets – especially when flexibility measures are available but remain underused.

Holistic grid planning

More integrated regional grid planning and connectivity can not only improve energy security but also help identify the most cost-effective projects that will improve social welfare. Achieving this depends on transmission system operators (TSOs) working together in a spirit of solidarity rather than the isolation that still characterises much of the region.  Over time, a centralised agency or institute with the capacity to develop robust modelling and engage TSOs around shared findings may be necessary to guide the development of optimal cross-border projects.

For now, cross-border investments rarely rise to the top of national or TSO priorities.  Furthermore, TSOs in the region tend to prefer traditional baseload systems and focus on national solutions, although this is not always the case – for example the Baltics countries have pursued high renewable shares and strong interconnectivity. While there is broad recognition that stronger European coordination will be needed to achieve decarbonisation and security goals, there remains considerable scepticism toward EU-led coordination and oversight.

Price regulation

Regulated heat prices are a common feature across Central and Eastern Europe, effectively removing the most important incentive for energy savings and flexibility – the price signal. While there are clear political motivations to maintain low energy prices, this approach ultimately proves far more costly and damaging for society in less visible ways. In the near term, artificially low prices encourage over-consumption rather than energy savings and conservation – costs that are ultimately subsidised by non-household consumers and taxpayers.

Moreover, the prevailing environment of low prices and limited returns has led to alarming underinvestment in clean energy and low-temperature infrastructure, effectively locking in the deteriorating, fossil-intensive energy system of the 20th century.