Energy arbitrage
Energy arbitrage is one of the main revenue streams for energy storage projects. BESS can profit from electricity price differences by charging during low-price periods and discharging during high-price ones.
Reform of TOU tariffs change revenue model for behind-the-meter BESS
In China, BESS projects, especially behind-the-meter BESS of industrial and commercial users, have historically relied on energy arbitrage based on time-of-use (TOU) tariffs. Since the 1980s, TOU tariffs in China have largely been set by provincial governments. For energy storage projects, these relatively fixed tariffs allowed predictable and stable revenue. However, such pricing mechanisms are becoming increasingly less fit for a system with higher renewable integration.
Therefore, this framework has been changing during the recent national power market reform. In December 2025, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and National Energy Administration (NEA) issued a major document that establishes the rules for the mid- to long-term electricity market. Among other rules, the document calls for the removal of administratively determined TOU tariffs from March 2026.
Following the direction of the national reform, by June 2026, nine provinces in China have cancelled fixed TOU tariffs, with two more provinces in the consultation phase of the reform process. Instead, TOU pricing mechanisms are increasingly informed by wholesale spot market signals, although implementation differs across provinces in terms of pricing formation and the scope of market participation.
More market-based pricing mechanisms are able to better capture system conditions and provide real-time price signals. This enables BESS to respond more accurately to grid needs, allowing energy storage to realise their system value driven by market signals.
Standalone BESS’s market participation
Opportunities for standalone BESS to participate in the electricity market became official at the national level from 2022.
Though some provinces acted earlier, the central government explicitly encouraged BESS to enter the electricity market from June 2022. The policy also defined the legal boundaries of standalone energy storage, and encouraged co-located BESS to convert to standalone status to trade in the market.
It is important to note that, at this stage of the market reform, energy arbitrage alone cannot yet support a strong business case for BESS projects.
Compared to more mature international markets, China’s spot market price signals remain relatively weak. Restrictive price caps limit the arbitrage returns that standalone BESS can earn. While many provinces have revised their spot market rules to widen these price limits since Document 136 in February 2025, returns from energy arbitrage alone are still insufficient to meet the internal rate of return (IRR) requirements for most projects.
Capacity leasing
Capacity leasing is a mechanism where standalone BESS rents out their capacity to solar and wind projects, helping developers meet co-location requirements and flexibility needs.
Leasing prices are not set at the national level. Several provinces have introduced localised price caps or floors to regulate the market, applying varied rules across different regions.
In China, capacity leasing has been an important revenue stream for many standalone storage projects during the period of renewable co-location mandates. However, following the removal of these mandates, the demand for leasing capacity shrink significantly.
Furthermore, the January 2026 Document 114 clarifies that while standalone storage is eligible for capacity remuneration, projects cannot be compensated if they are already supported by other mechanisms.
For example, Inner Mongolia, one of the frontrunners for setting capacity remuneration for BESS, clarified in 2024 that standalone BESS must choose between leasing out their capacity or receiving capacity remuneration. Double compensation is prohibited.
Fundamentally, capacity leasing is designed to support renewable energy consumption and cut curtailment. It therefore represents a different value stream for BESS compared to the other revenue streams outlined in this section.
Ancillary service market
BESS provides key ancillary services to the power system – frequency regulation, inertia support, voltage control, etc. The system value of these ancillary services are increasingly becoming an independent revenue stream for BESS.
Ancillary service market reform is a key element of China’s broader power market reform. Current efforts aim to shift ancillary services from an administratively managed add-on to an integrated part of the power market.
In 2021, China updated its national rules to allow BESS to participate in the ancillary service market.
In 2025, China introduced its basic rules for the ancillary service market, further clarifying participation rules for BESS. The rules also strengthen links with other markets. For example, the same BESS asset can participate in both spot and ancillary service markets.
The policy encourages provinces with sufficient operational capacity to adopt joint clearing. This allows market assets to bid into both the spot and ancillary service markets simultaneously, using a unified mechanism to optimise clearing and deploy assets where they add the most value. This will facilitate revenue stacking and better reward the value that batteries bring to the system.
Some provinces are taking a more proactive approach. For example, Shandong, a frontrunner in China’s power market reform, updated its power market regulations in April 2026. The new rules state that ancillary service and spot markets should move towards joint clearing where technically feasible.
Capacity pricing mechanism
Another important element that China has been exploring is the establishment of a market-based capacity pricing mechanism.
Several provinces have moved ahead of national guidance. In November 2023, Inner Mongolia began remuneration for pilot standalone BESS based on their power discharge. More recently, Gansu aligned its capacity remuneration standards, applying the same benchmark to standalone BESS and coal power plants.
At the national level, the government had established capacity pricing frameworks for pumped hydro and coal power plants earlier on. A key policy update for the BESS sector arrived in January 2026, explicitly expanding this national scope to include standalone BESS projects, moving towards a more technology neutral framework.
Following the national guidance, 12 Chinese provinces have released their capacity remuneration standards by June 2026.
Expanding the capacity pricing mechanism is crucial for the sector, since previous fixed revenue streams, such as energy arbitrage from fixed TOU tariffs and capacity leasing, are phasing out, yet market mechanisms are not mature enough to ensure BESS profitability on their own.
Unlocking value from behind-the-meter batteries
New business models are emerging for batteries in China. Combining these assets through aggregators offers an opportunity to expand revenue streams, in particular for behind-the-meter batteries.
Aggregators pool diverse energy sources onto integrated platforms. Notably, virtual power plants (VPPs) use digital technologies to coordinate distributed energy resources.
Integrating BESS into VPPs balances the aggregator’s network and optimises its overall efficiency. It also allows behind-the-meter batteries to participate in revenue streams that are typically reserved for larger assets.
On one hand, BESS can participate in power market trading through the VPP, unlocking extra revenue for the project. Frontrunner provinces in China’s power market reform, such as Guangdong, Shandong, Shanxi and Yunnan, already allow VPPs to trade directly in the wholesale market.
On the other hand, by participating in demand-side response through VPPs, BESS can earn remuneration. The demand-side response remuneration is paid to energy users for managing their local loads, helping to shave peak demand and maintain grid stability.