Europe is highly vulnerable due to reliance on fossil imports

1.1 The EU is one of the world’s economies most dependent on fossil imports

Imported fossil fuels supplied 58% of EU primary energy needs in 2023, a similar proportion to before the energy crisis. This makes the EU significantly more dependent on fossil imports than other major economies such as China (24%) and India (37%), while only Japan (84%) and South Korea (80%) have higher dependencies. 

1.2 EU fossil import dependency is a vulnerability

High dependency on fossil imports exposes European consumers to multiple risks, including political blackmail, price volatility and unpredictable supply interruptions.

A few suppliers still dominate EU gas and oil imports

In 2021, Russia was the EU’s top supplier of both oil and gas, providing 43% of gas imports and 27% of oil imports. Cutting this dependency became a top priority following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, yet Russia still supplied 18% of EU gas imports and 3% of oil imports in 2024. An accelerated energy transition could have replaced Russian gas entirely by 2025, but instead this is only expected by 2027.

While the EU has lowered reliance on Russia, new dependencies have emerged. The US is now the EU’s top supplier of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), and the second largest of gas after Norway. Furthermore, oil and gas imports remain highly concentrated in a few suppliers. The EU’s top four gas suppliers provided 86% of imports in 2021 and still provided 83% in 2024. Oil imports are less concentrated, but again dependency has hardly changed. The EU’s top five oil suppliers provided 60% of imports in 2021 and 54% in 2024. 

Such high dependence on a few suppliers makes Europe vulnerable to political pressure and manipulation. The United States has already used this leverage in trade talks to demand further fossil fuel purchases in exchange for lower tariffs. Also this year, Qatar – the EU’s 5th largest gas supplier – threatened to cut LNG supplies unless the EU weakened labour and environmental rules.

Europe is also vulnerable to supply disruptions, made worse by geographical and political risks. For example, gas imports from Algeria and Egypt faced technical difficulties in 2024, while Nigeria’s gas exports are constrained by security challenges. Furthermore, a significant volume of global oil trade transits through unstable chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. 

Fossil imports cost the EU an extra €930 billion during the gas crisis

The recent gas crisis demonstrated the risk of fossil price volatility to an extreme degree. Between 2021 and 2022, the oil price doubled, coal quadrupled, and fossil gas prices soared to €350/MWh from a pre-crisis norm of around €15/MWh. Gas prices remain elevated and volatile, with prices averaging €41/MWh in H1-2025, up 41% compared to H1-2024. During the main years of the crisis (2021-2024), fossil fuel imports cost the EU a total of €1.8 trillion. This is more than double what they would have cost at pre-crisis prices, adding €930 billion to the EU’s import bill. As gas prices remain elevated, this is set to continue.

1.3 EU fossil import dependency will remain high without growth in electrification and clean power

While significant progress has been made in growing renewable energy and reducing energy demand, import dependency has remained high due to declining fossil fuel production within the EU and a failure to increase electrification.

A significant rebound in domestic fossil production is highly unlikely to materialise, and even if it did, this would not shield consumers from shocks, as prices would remain tied to volatile international markets.

The EU has never been a significant producer of oil. Import dependency was 93% in the 1990s and has risen ever since. Fossil gas production was once higher, with import dependency as low as 50% in the 1990s, but dependency has steadily grown to 90% as consumption grew and production declined. Output from existing European gas fields is projected to decline further. The Netherlands – once the EU’s top gas producer – is set to phase out onshore production, which is unlikely to be offset by proposed increases offshore. Romania – now the EU’s top gas producer – aims to double production to 20 bcm per year by 2027. However, this is equivalent to only 6% of EU consumption in 2024.